Read the full report in Portuguese, the initial report of the investigations into the crash of Air France 447.
Special preface to the Portuguese text
This text has been translated and published by the BEA to facilitate reading by Brazilian speakers. As accurate as the translation may be, it is the original French text that should be considered as the reference work
flight history
On Sunday, May 31, 2009, the Airbus A330-203, registration F-GZCP, operated by Air France was scheduled to operate the regular flight AF447 between Rio de Janeiro Galeão and Paris Charles de Gaulle. Twelve crew members (3 PNT, 9 PNC) and 216 passengers were on board. Departure was scheduled for 10:00 PM (1).
At 10:10 PM, the crew was authorized to start the engines and leave the apron. Takeoff occurred at 10:29 PM. The captain is PNF, and one of the co-pilots is PF.
The takeoff weight was 232.8 t (for an MTOW of 233 t), and included 70.4 tons of fuel.
At 1:35:15 AM (1), the crew informed the ATLANTICO controller that they had passed point INTOL and announced the following estimates: SALPU at 1:48 AM and ORARO at 2:00 AM. They also
transmitted their SELCAL code, and a test was successfully performed.
At 1:35:46 AM, the controller asked them to maintain FL350 and report their estimate for point TASIL.
At 1:55 AM, the captain woke up the second co-pilot and said, "[...] go take my place."
Between 1:59:32 AM and 2:01:46 AM (2), the captain observed the briefing between the two co-pilots, where PF mainly stated that "the little turbulence you just
saw [...] we should encounter more ahead [...] we are in the layer, unfortunately we cannot go much higher now because the temperature is decreasing less rapidly than expected" and that "the connection with Dakar failed." The captain then left the cockpit.
The aircraft was approaching point ORARO. It was flying at flight level 350 and at a Mach speed of 0.82; the longitudinal attitude was around 2.5 degrees. The aircraft's weight and center of gravity
were around 205 tons and 29%. The autopilot 2 and auto-thrust were engaged.
At 2:06:04 AM, PF called the PNC and told them that "in two minutes, we should hit an area more disturbed than now and we should be careful there," adding, "I'll call you as soon as we get out of there."
Universal Time (UT) is the time reference used in aviation.
At 2:08:07 AM (3), PNF proposed, "you can, possibly, take a bit to the
left [...]". The aircraft began a slight left turn; the deviation from the initially followed route was about 12 degrees. The turbulence level increased slightly, and the crew decided to reduce Mach to 0.8.
From 2:10:05 AM (4), the autopilot and then the auto-thrust were disengaged, and PF announced, "I have the controls." The aircraft rolled to the right, and PF applied a left and pitch-up action. The stall alarm sounded twice. The recorded parameters showed a brutal drop from about 275 kt to 60 kt in the indicated airspeed on the left side, and a few moments later, the indicated airspeed on the rescue instrument (ISIS).
Note 1: only the indicated airspeeds on the left side and on the ISIS were recorded by the parameter recorder; the indicated airspeed on the right side was not recorded.
Note 2: the autopilot and auto-thrust remained disengaged until the end of the flight.
At 2:10:16 AM, PNF said, "we lost speeds," and then, "alternate law [...]".
Note 1: incidence is the angle between the relative wind and the longitudinal axis of the aircraft. This information was not presented to the pilots.
Note 2: in alternate or direct law, incidence protections are no longer available, but a stall warning alarm is activated when the highest of the valid incidence values exceeds a certain limit.
The aircraft's attitude gradually increased to over 10 degrees, leading to an upward trajectory. PF applied pitch-down and alternating right and left inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, decreased to 700 ft/min, and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The indicated airspeed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The aircraft was then at an altitude of about 37,500 feet, and the recorded incidence was about 4 degrees.
From 2:10:50 AM, PNF repeatedly tried to call the captain.
At 2:10:51 AM (5), the stall alarm sounded again. The thrust levers were moved to the TO/GA position, and PF maintained his nose-up command. The recorded incidence, about 6 degrees when the stall alarm sounded, continued to increase. The adjustable horizontal stabilizer (PHR) went from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in approximately 1 minute; it remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Fifteen seconds later, the indicated airspeed on the ISIS abruptly increased to 185 kt; it was consistent with the other recorded speed. PF continued to give nose-up commands. The aircraft's altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 feet, its attitude and incidence were 16 degrees.
Note: the inconsistency between the indicated airspeeds on the left side and on the ISIS lasted for just under a minute.
At 2:11:40 AM (6), the captain returned to the cockpit. Within seconds, all recorded airspeeds became invalid, and the stall alarm stopped.
Note: when measured speeds are less than 60 kt, the measured incidence values are considered invalid and are not taken into account by the systems. When they are less than 30 kt, the speed values themselves are considered invalid.
The altitude was then around 35,000 feet, the incidence exceeded 40 degrees, and the vertical speed was approximately -10,000 ft/min. The aircraft's attitude did not exceed 15 degrees, and the engine N1s were close to 100%. The aircraft experienced roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees. PF applied a control stick input to the extreme left and nose-up, which lasted for about 30 seconds.
At 2:12:02 AM, PF said, "I don't have any indications anymore," and FNP said, "we don't have any valid indications." At this point, the thrust levers were in the IDLE position, and the engine N1s were at 55%. Fifteen seconds later, PF made pitch-down inputs. In the moments that followed, there was a decrease in incidence, the speeds became valid again, and the stall alarm reactivated.
At 2:13:32 AM, PF said, "we're going to level off at 100." About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous inputs from both pilots on the mini-sticks were recorded, and PF said, "come on, you have the controls."
The incidence, when valid, was always above 35 degrees.
The recordings stopped at 2:14:28 AM. The last recorded values were vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min, ground speed of 107 kt, pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees, roll of 5.3 degrees left, and magnetic heading of 270 degrees.
New Facts Established
At this stage of the investigation, in addition to the BEA reports of July 2 and December 17, 2009, the following new facts have been established:
ˆ The crew composition was in accordance with the operator's procedures.
ˆ At the time of the event, the mass and center of gravity were within operational limits.
ˆ At the time of the event, the two co-pilots were in the cockpit, and the captain was resting. The latter returned to the cockpit approximately 1 minute 30 seconds after the autopilot disengagement.
ˆ There was an inconsistency between the indicated airspeed on the left side and the one indicated on the rescue instrument (ISIS). It lasted for just under a minute.
ˆ After the autopilot disengagement:
- „the aircraft climbed to 38,000 feet;
- „the stall alarm sounded, and the aircraft entered a stall;
- „PF's commands were primarily nose-up;
- „the descent lasted 3 min 30 s, during which the aircraft remained in a stalled condition. The incidence increased and remained above 35 degrees;
- the engines were running and always responded to the crew's commands.
ˆ The last recorded values were pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees, roll of 5.3 degrees left, and vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.
Read the full report in Portuguese, the initial report of the investigations into the crash of Air France 447.
Special preface to the Portuguese text
This text has been translated and published by the BEA to facilitate reading by Brazilian speakers. As accurate as the translation may be, it is the original French text that should be considered as the reference work
flight history
On Sunday, May 31, 2009, the Airbus A330-203, registration F-GZCP, operated by Air France was scheduled to operate the regular flight AF447 between Rio de Janeiro Galeão and Paris Charles de Gaulle. Twelve crew members (3 PNT, 9 PNC) and 216 passengers were on board. Departure was scheduled for 10:00 PM (1).
At 10:10 PM, the crew was authorized to start the engines and leave the apron. Takeoff occurred at 10:29 PM. The captain is PNF, and one of the co-pilots is PF.
The takeoff weight was 232.8 t (for an MTOW of 233 t), and included 70.4 tons of fuel.
At 1:35:15 AM (1), the crew informed the ATLANTICO controller that they had passed point INTOL and announced the following estimates: SALPU at 1:48 AM and ORARO at 2:00 AM. They also
transmitted their SELCAL code, and a test was successfully performed.
At 1:35:46 AM, the controller asked them to maintain FL350 and report their estimate for point TASIL.
At 1:55 AM, the captain woke up the second co-pilot and said, "[...] go take my place."
Between 1:59:32 AM and 2:01:46 AM (2), the captain observed the briefing between the two co-pilots, where PF mainly stated that "the little turbulence you just
saw [...] we should encounter more ahead [...] we are in the layer, unfortunately we cannot go much higher now because the temperature is decreasing less rapidly than expected" and that "the connection with Dakar failed." The captain then left the cockpit.
The aircraft was approaching point ORARO. It was flying at flight level 350 and at a Mach speed of 0.82; the longitudinal attitude was around 2.5 degrees. The aircraft's weight and center of gravity
were around 205 tons and 29%. The autopilot 2 and auto-thrust were engaged.
At 2:06:04 AM, PF called the PNC and told them that "in two minutes, we should hit an area more disturbed than now and we should be careful there," adding, "I'll call you as soon as we get out of there."
Universal Time (UT) is the time reference used in aviation.
At 2:08:07 AM (3), PNF proposed, "you can, possibly, take a bit to the
left [...]". The aircraft began a slight left turn; the deviation from the initially followed route was about 12 degrees. The turbulence level increased slightly, and the crew decided to reduce Mach to 0.8.
From 2:10:05 AM (4), the autopilot and then the auto-thrust were disengaged, and PF announced, "I have the controls." The aircraft rolled to the right, and PF applied a left and pitch-up action. The stall alarm sounded twice. The recorded parameters showed a brutal drop from about 275 kt to 60 kt in the indicated airspeed on the left side, and a few moments later, the indicated airspeed on the rescue instrument (ISIS).
Note 1: only the indicated airspeeds on the left side and on the ISIS were recorded by the parameter recorder; the indicated airspeed on the right side was not recorded.
Note 2: the autopilot and auto-thrust remained disengaged until the end of the flight.
At 2:10:16 AM, PNF said, "we lost speeds," and then, "alternate law [...]".
Note 1: incidence is the angle between the relative wind and the longitudinal axis of the aircraft. This information was not presented to the pilots.
Note 2: in alternate or direct law, incidence protections are no longer available, but a stall warning alarm is activated when the highest of the valid incidence values exceeds a certain limit.
The aircraft's attitude gradually increased to over 10 degrees, leading to an upward trajectory. PF applied pitch-down and alternating right and left inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, decreased to 700 ft/min, and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The indicated airspeed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The aircraft was then at an altitude of about 37,500 feet, and the recorded incidence was about 4 degrees.
From 2:10:50 AM, PNF repeatedly tried to call the captain.
At 2:10:51 AM (5), the stall alarm sounded again. The thrust levers were moved to the TO/GA position, and PF maintained his nose-up command. The recorded incidence, about 6 degrees when the stall alarm sounded, continued to increase. The adjustable horizontal stabilizer (PHR) went from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in approximately 1 minute; it remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Fifteen seconds later, the indicated airspeed on the ISIS abruptly increased to 185 kt; it was consistent with the other recorded speed. PF continued to give nose-up commands. The aircraft's altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 feet, its attitude and incidence were 16 degrees.
Note: the inconsistency between the indicated airspeeds on the left side and on the ISIS lasted for just under a minute.
At 2:11:40 AM (6), the captain returned to the cockpit. Within seconds, all recorded airspeeds became invalid, and the stall alarm stopped.
Note: when measured speeds are less than 60 kt, the measured incidence values are considered invalid and are not taken into account by the systems. When they are less than 30 kt, the speed values themselves are considered invalid.
The altitude was then around 35,000 feet, the incidence exceeded 40 degrees, and the vertical speed was approximately -10,000 ft/min. The aircraft's attitude did not exceed 15 degrees, and the engine N1s were close to 100%. The aircraft experienced roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees. PF applied a control stick input to the extreme left and nose-up, which lasted for about 30 seconds.
At 2:12:02 AM, PF said, "I don't have any indications anymore," and FNP said, "we don't have any valid indications." At this point, the thrust levers were in the IDLE position, and the engine N1s were at 55%. Fifteen seconds later, PF made pitch-down inputs. In the moments that followed, there was a decrease in incidence, the speeds became valid again, and the stall alarm reactivated.
At 2:13:32 AM, PF said, "we're going to level off at 100." About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous inputs from both pilots on the mini-sticks were recorded, and PF said, "come on, you have the controls."
The incidence, when valid, was always above 35 degrees.
The recordings stopped at 2:14:28 AM. The last recorded values were vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min, ground speed of 107 kt, pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees, roll of 5.3 degrees left, and magnetic heading of 270 degrees.
New Facts Established
At this stage of the investigation, in addition to the BEA reports of July 2 and December 17, 2009, the following new facts have been established:
ˆ The crew composition was in accordance with the operator's procedures.
ˆ At the time of the event, the mass and center of gravity were within operational limits.
ˆ At the time of the event, the two co-pilots were in the cockpit, and the captain was resting. The latter returned to the cockpit approximately 1 minute 30 seconds after the autopilot disengagement.
ˆ There was an inconsistency between the indicated airspeed on the left side and the one indicated on the rescue instrument (ISIS). It lasted for just under a minute.
ˆ After the autopilot disengagement:
- „the aircraft climbed to 38,000 feet;
- „the stall alarm sounded, and the aircraft entered a stall;
- „PF's commands were primarily nose-up;
- „the descent lasted 3 min 30 s, during which the aircraft remained in a stalled condition. The incidence increased and remained above 35 degrees;
- the engines were running and always responded to the crew's commands.
ˆ The last recorded values were pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees, roll of 5.3 degrees left, and vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.
